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Abstract
A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt
public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two
main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where
public institutions are large buyers. Second, ﬁrms favoured with cor-
rupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related ac-
tivities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic
database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year
period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the
country’s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions
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11 Introduction
Public procurement of goods and services is one of the main areas at risk of
corruption in developing countries where regulations and legal enforcement
are weak. On top of the static cost of corruption and fund embezzlement,
systematic departures from competition in the attribution of public markets
are likely to have a devastating impact on economic agents’ incentives and
as a result on these countries’ productive structure. This paper presents the
ﬁrst large scale micro-level evidence on the channels of rent-seeking and its
impact on economic development, using a unique database of nearly 50,000
public procurement operations in Paraguay, covering the period 2004 to 2007.
In a nutshell, we show that in Paraguay corrupt behavior in the allocation of
public contracts is a key channel for rent-seeking. This large-scale network
of favoritism, sometimes coined “la patria contratista”,1 has deeply damag-
ing economic consequences: public institutions buy goods and services at
inﬂated prices, and the set of incentives facing potential entrepreneurs is
biased towards unproductive activities.
To guide the analysis, we model the choice of potential entrepreneurs with
idiosyncratic cost levels, between remaining in the informal sector or paying
a ﬁxed entry fee to become formal. Moreover, in the formal sector they face
the additional alternative of joining a productive segment, where they serve
private consumers competitively, or a rent-seeking one, where they sell to
public institutions. In this rent sector, contracts are attributed by corrupt
oﬃcials, who distort allocation rules in exchange for bribes. Firms willing
to do business with the Government must therefore be proﬁtable enough to
cover their production costs as well as the formality fee and the bribes. We
derive from the model two main sets of predictions that are sustained by the
data, revealing the following story.
First, we establish that in Paraguay the main channel for corruption
1The “contracting homeland”, see for example Alfredo Boccia Paz, Diario Ultima Hora,
Asuncion, March 4th, 2009.
2in procurement is the systematic use of an “exceptional” purchase mecha-
nism, which bypasses legally required minimum standards of transparency
and competition. Exceptional purchases are made more frequently by insti-
tutions, which are big buyers of speciﬁc goods. Thus, when the public sector
concentrates a large share of a domestic market, which happens mostly in
import-oriented and service activities, corruption rises. Moreover, the data
reveal that this eﬀect is reinforced by repeated interactions of these insti-
tutions with favoured ﬁrms: exceptional purchase is used more often by
institutions-ﬁrms pairs that trade in large volumes.
Second, this implies that ﬁrms making more business with the State,
those in the so-called rent sectors, enjoy above normal rates of return and
are the most eﬃcient ones. We provide evidence of these two aspects, by
showing that ﬁrms selling more to the public sector, as well as those selling
more through the exception channel, have higher proﬁt margins, despite the
fact that they trade mostly in standard goods and should face competition
for the market.
As a result, average relative proﬁtability should be biased towards sectors
with an important procurement component, distorting ﬁrms’ incentives and
inducing additional entry in these activities. To the extent that this self-
selection process pushes some of the best potential entrepreneurs towards
rent sectors, distracting them from innovative or export-oriented ventures, it
generates a serious misallocation of talents issue across the economy. Indeed,
we document this strong selection bias by exploiting an original econometric
strategy using ﬁrms’ names.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main
strands of related literature and spells out the contributions of the paper.
Section 3 describes the Paraguayan institutional environment. Section 4
develops the model and derives empirical predictions. Section 5 presents the
data. Sections 6 and 7 present the results related to the two main sets of
theoretical predictions, and Section 8 concludes.
32 Literature Review
The idea that rent-seeking behavior has important social and economic costs
is a relatively long-standing one in the economic and political science liter-
ature. Early contributions such as Tullock (1967; 1971), Buchanan (1980),
Krueger (1974) and Baghwati (1982), were concerned, mostly in a theoreti-
cal framework, with the diﬀerent types of costs associated with the transfer
of rents and the waste generated by agents engaging time and resources in
competing for rents, for example through political lobbying or corruption.
More recently, some papers have provided explanations for ways in which
rent-seeking entails dynamic costs. Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1991) focus for example on the resulting dysfunctional allocation of
talents. In this approach, potential investments in physical or human capital
are directed to rent-abundant sectors (such as those stemming from political
favors, corruption or exploitation of natural resources), while investments in
innovative activities, which have greater growth potential, become relatively
less attractive and are discouraged. As supporting empirical evidence, Mur-
phy et al. (1991) present cross-country growth regressions augmented with
country level proportions of engineering and law students, where the former
are said to correspond to investments in productive activities while the latter
are considered rent-seekers. Baumol’s evidence, on the other hand, is based
on historical accounts from Rome, Ancient China and the Middle Ages.
To date, there is still very little micro-evidence on the actual channels and
consequences of rent-seeking in developing economies. Some papers have
stressed the diﬀerence in performance between “captor” and “non-captor”
ﬁrms in transition countries (depending on their ability to inﬂuence regu-
lations or attract speciﬁc concessions), using either subjective answers on
inﬂuence in ﬁrm surveys (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003; Fries, Ly-
senko, and Polanec, 2003), or regional measures of preferential treatment
received by a sub-sample of large ﬁrms (Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya,
2004). Other contributions have documented the importance of political con-
4nections in securing access to key economic inputs. For example, Li, Meng,
Wang and Zhou (2008) show that Chinese Communist Party members are
more likely to obtain credit for their ﬁrms; Khwaja and Mian (2005) show
how lending by public banks in Pakistan is systematically distorted towards
ﬁrms with politicians on their boards; Hsieh, Miguel, Ortega and Rodriguez
(2008) show that ﬁrms, whose directors have signed the recall petition against
Chávez in Venezuela (the “Maisanta”), have experienced signiﬁcantly lower
performance thereafter, in particular because of a rising tax burden and more
diﬃcult access to foreign exchange; Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) study how
directors’ political connections help secure better regulatory conditions in
the US; Fisman (2001) computes the stock market value of Indonesian ﬁrms
derived from political connections to the Suharto network, using exogenous
shocks to the dictator’s health. At a more general level, the large literature
on corruption that developed since the 1990s is also relevant here, and es-
pecially the strand of more recent papers using microeconomic evidence to
directly measure corruption and its eﬀects on outcomes.2
A fewcontributions have dealt speciﬁcally with public procurement. Hyyti-
nen, Lundberg and Toinaven (2007), who study the eﬀects of politics on mu-
nicipal cleaning contracts in Sweden, show that the lowest bidder does not
win 58% of the time and that the choice of the winner is subject to political
considerations; Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009) show that US companies
connected, through the composition of their boards, to the winning party in
both legislative and presidential elections (in 1994 and 2000) are signiﬁcantly
more likely to have experienced an increase in procurement contracts. Refer-
ences dealing explicitely with corruption include Di Tella and Schargrodsky
(2003), who document the impact of a crackdown on corruption in Argen-
tinean hospitals, and Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009), who disentangle
2Authoritative surveys on corruption include Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999),
Svensson (2005) and Pande (2008) among others. Micro-econometric papers include
Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Olken (2007), Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna and Mullainathan
(2007) and Ferraz and Finan (2007) to mention only a few.
5the eﬀect of passive (ineﬃciency) versus active waste (corruption) in Italy,
ﬁnding that the former accounts for about four times the eﬀect of the latter.
With respect to this literature, our paper provides several original con-
tributions. First, we have data not only on the expenses realized by public
institutions, but also on the ﬁrms that are on the selling side. This enables
us to capture the eﬀect of large scale corrupt practices on the proﬁtability of
ﬁrms and hence on the industrial structure of the economy.3 We provide evi-
dence of the distortive eﬀects of rent-seeking in terms of economic eﬃciency,
by showing that it implies an ineﬃcient specialization of the more able entre-
preneurs in imports and procurement activities. Second, we document one
of the most prevalent channels of corruption in procurement activity, namely
the use of purchase mechanisms circumventing standard rules, and uncover
the economic characteristics of the institutions and sectors more prone to it.
3 Country Overview: Rent-Seeking and Cor-
ruption in Procurement
Paraguay is a small landlocked country of 6.2 million inhabitants (2008)
located in the heart of South America. With a per capita GDP of US$
1,670 in 2008, it is a low-middle income country. Its main sources of growth
are agrarian activities and local services.4 The country also enjoys a unique
source of rent in the form of revenues from big hydroelectric dams shared
with its neighbors Argentina and Brazil. The biggest one is Itaipú, on the
river Paraná between Paraguay and Brazil. Until the Chinese Three Gorges
dam was built, Itaipú was the largest hydroelectric power plant in the world.
3Related papers are Rama (1993), who tracks the number of foreign-trade rent-seeking
regulations over the XXth century in Uruguay and relates these to political and economic
variables, and Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004), who present cross-country, industry level
evidence of the eﬀect of regulatory distortions on the industrial structure.
4Indeed, a few non-processed commodities constitute its very narrow export base: 50%
of all exports are in 3 traditional products (soy, cotton and meat); adding other barely
processed commodities makes up close to 90% of total exports.
6It has 20 turbines, 1 of which provides 90% of all the energy used in Paraguay.
The rest is channeled to Brazil.5 In exchange, Paraguay receives every year
an enormous amount of royalties, amounting to US$ 366 millions in 2005
(resp. US$ 553 millions in 2006), equivalent to 4.9% (resp. 5.8%) of GDP.
This is approximately 50% of the total government tax collection (from VAT,
custom duties, and rent, by order of magnitude).
Politically, after enduring the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner between
1954 and 1989, Paraguay returned to democracy through a military coup in
1989. Yet, the Asociación Nacional Republicana, traditionally known as Col-
orado Party, managed to retain power for 61 years, including the 19 years
elapsed since the 1989 coup and covering the whole period of our study.6
Given this political context, the dams’ propitious source of income shaped
the growth of the Paraguayan “rent-seeking economy”. First, the dams’
construction fostered a culture of intense rent-seeking and corruption and
allowed a few entrepreneurs that were on good terms with the dictator to be-
come immensely rich. Second, the free ﬂow of resources to the government’s
budget meant that bureaucrats were in a position to favor friends through
public expenses. During the whole period, the party eﬀectively “privatized”
public resources, using public employment and procurement to favor party
members.7 As a result, Paraguay is considered to be one of the most corrupt
countries in the world.8
An important channel for corruption, which we focus on here, is the allo-
5Additionally, there is another huge dam, the Yacyreta one, lower down on the same
river, on the border between Paraguay and Argentina. It is about one fourth the size of
Itaipú.
6See Pérez-Liñán et al. (2006) for a description of the political environment of Paraguay.
In April 2008, the Colorado party was ﬁnally defeated in the presidential election by an
opposition coalition led by former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo.
7See for example Nickson and Lambert (2002).
8It has lingered in the bottom 4% of surveyed countries included in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index since its inclusion in 2002. It had for instance
a score of 2.1 in 2005, placing it 144th out of 158, and the same score in 2009 (154th out
of 180).
7cation of public contracts to ﬁrms that in most cases are created with the sole
purpose of supplying the state, often by selling a wide variety of imported
goods. There is ample anecdotal evidence of corruption in public procure-
ment. As a result, and under pressure from international organizations, a law
regulating public procurement practices (law 2051/03) was enacted in 2003
by the government of the newly elected president Nicanor Duarte Frutos,
with the announced intention of promoting transparency and eﬃciency in
public purchases. The most signiﬁcant of its provisions were the creation of
a public procurement watchdog (the National Directorate of Public Procure-
ment, or DNCP), the design of a menu of purchase mechanisms to regulate
procurement procedures, and the compulsion to make all information (calls,
providers, award etc.) public. This last proviso was accompanied by the
creation of the DNCP web site where this information is available, but in
practice access is often intermittent and the interface is impractical.
There are strong indications however that improvements in the regula-
tory framework did not translate quickly into cleaner procurement practices,
partly because many oﬃcials did not comply with the new law and the wrong-
doings continued.9 As shown in Figure 1 below, in the period under study
over 70% of all procurement contracts are awarded without competition. The
main mechanism through which ﬁrms are favored is the use of the exceptional
purchase mechanism, by which speciﬁc regulations, such as the obligation to
organize public tenders above certain amounts, are disregarded (see details
in Section 5 below).
In 2006, Transparencia Paraguay (TP), the local chapter of Transparency
International, published an extensive report focusing on the excessive use
9The World Bank’s review of Paraguay’s public expenditure in 2006 states that: “Op-
erational eﬃciency is reduced by the existence of informal arrangements alongside formal
rules. While spending control is highly centralized, with detailed rules concerning (...)
procurement and other items of expenditure, these formal controls are often violated in
practice [and] informal arrangements dictate how (...) procurement is contracted. When
formal rules are unworkable and government operates through extralegal means, corrup-
tion rises although it often goes undetected or unreported.”
8of exceptional procedures, which was clearly identiﬁed as one of the main
irregularities in the procurement process. Indeed, in 2004 and 2005 purchases
made through the “exceptional” procedure amounted to nearly 23% of the
total procurement spending. For example during that period public ﬁrms
awarded close to 90% of their advertisement contracts through exceptions.
As for speciﬁc institution, the Oﬃce of the First Lady spent respectively 40%
and 93% of its budget in these two years using the exceptional mechanism.10
Because the report was given ample coverage in the local media and
through public presentations, some of the oﬃcials in charge of procurement
in public institutions may have become more cautious. Indeed, purchases
made through the “exceptional” procedure decreased over the period that
we study. Still, they did not disappear, representing 17.3% of the total
procurement spending between 2004 and 2007.
In 2006 the Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice channeled 23% of its
total spending through exceptions, while for the public enterprise “Cañas
Paraguayas”11 the corresponding ﬁgure was 59%. In 2007, an electoral year,
the Presidency spent 16% of its budget through exceptional contracts. In all
these cases, it is diﬃcult to argue that the use of the exception responded
either to situations of emergency or to non-competitive markets. The Elec-
tricity State-owned enterprise ANDE has also been pointed out for buying
large numbers of electric transformers in this way, despite the fact that these
are routinely required by the ﬁrm for network repairs. Firm oﬃcials recog-
nize that this practice usually generates excess pricing of between 17 and
27%.12 During the yellow fever outbreak of 2008, a state of national emer-
gency was declared and, as a result, the Health Ministry proceeded to buy
10Some cases have made headlines, such as the use of this procedure to pay close to US$
100,000 to a consulting ﬁrm formerly owned by the President, for the organization of the
XIIIth conference gathering Americas’ First Ladies in 2005 in Asunción (Diario Ultima
Hora, Asunción, June 7th, 2007).
11The State-owned alcohol-producing ﬁrm.
12Diario ABC Color, Asunción, January 3rd, 2010. This ﬁgures are consistent with the
estimation by Auriol (2006) and with the results in Section 7 below.
9large quantity of fuel through exceptional purchases. The main provider,
beneﬁted with half of the total purchase, did not even have a distribution
network in the interior of the country where the immunization campaign was
taking place, and close to three quarters of this fuel was actually delivered
after the emergency period.13 In a recent scandal, the education ministry
invoked exception grounds to spend US$3 millions on a building in the cen-
ter of Asunción, although such move had been planned for a about a year.
Another year later, it was announced that the building was falling apart and
that US$700,000 would be needed to ﬁx it.14
The next Section builds a model from which we derive testable predic-
tions.
4 The Model
The model focuses on constant returns to scale industries (i.e., linear cost
function).15 Entrepreneurs have the choice between the informal and the
formal sectors. In the informal sector, denoted by the superscript I, there is
no entry fee or taxation. Traditional production techniques prevail so that
the cost of production is CI(q) = cq, where q ≥ 0 is the quantity produced by
the ﬁrm. The sector being competitive, in equilibrium the price is pI = c > 0.
By contrast, in the formal sector, denoted by the superscript f, ﬁrms
need to pay an entry fee F ≥ 0.16 The total cost function of a producer
13Diario Ultima Hora, Asunción, July 25th, 2008.
14Diario ABC Color, Asunción, January 6th, 2010, and Diario Ultima Hora, Asunción,
December 22nd, 2010.
15This assumption is consistent with existing evidence on manufacturing and service
ﬁrms in developing countries, whether they belong to the formal or the informal sector
(see Tybout, 2000). It is also consistent with the nature of activities included in our
procurement database.
16In the model taxation goes entirely through the entry fees. Yet we could add a linear
tax t on operational proﬁt without changing the equilibrium (see Auriol and Warlters,
2005). In practice entry fees are higher, in percentage of per capita GDP, in poor countries
than in rich ones (Djankov et al., 2002).
10operating in the formal sector is Cf(q) = F + cfq, where by assumption
A1 cf is independently and uniformly distributed in [0,c].
Formality gives access to a large set of technologies and management
techniques so that entrepreneurs “abilities” (i.e., education, physical capital,
experience, attitude towards innovation, access to credit markets and so on)
matter. Production costs are hence lower and have a priori a wider dispersion
in the formal sector than in the informal one.
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss the corruption-free equilibrium.
In the absence of rent-seeking opportunities, entrepreneurs specialize in pro-
ductive activities. They serve market demand competitively and make no
rents in equilibrium. The demand is composed of the private demand D(p) =
A−p, where A > c is a scale parameter that indicates the depth of the mar-
ket,17 and the public demand DPub(p) =
Qc
p , where Qc > 0 is the ﬁxed public
budget allocated to procurement. For the private demand consumers pur-
chase from the cheapest provider. Proposition 1 summarizes the industrial
organization of this economy (see derivation in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 In a corruption-free economy, formality prevails in a given
industry if and only if




Proposition 1 implies that if F is small the traditional technique of pro-
duction disappears. On the other hand, in countries where barriers to entry
are high there is a segmentation between formal and informal sectors based
on types of business or industry. The sector is organized formally if demand
is strong (i.e., A and Q large), and if the diﬀerence in productivity between
traditional and modern methods of production, cI−cf∗ = c, is large enough.18
17Assumption A > c rules out corner solutions in the sequel of the paper. Note that
results are robust to other demand speciﬁcations (e.g., Cobb-Douglas).
18We expect cI − cf∗ to be small for services such as car washing or fruit selling. As a
result, these activities are informal in developing countries. On the contrary, sophisticated
11If (1) does not hold, public procurement cannot occur because by regulation
public oﬃcials are required to purchase from the formal sector. To rule out
this possibility in the sequel of the paper we make the following assumption:
A2 F < cQ.
Since A > c, under assumption A2 condition (1) always holds so that in
the absence of corruption formality prevails. Any distortion away from this
eﬃcient equilibrium can then be related to corruption.
4.1 Rent-Seeking
We assume that individuals managing public institutions’ purchases aim at
maximizing the total amount of bribes they extract from their suppliers.
While this assumption cannot be directly tested, because in practice corrup-
tion and bribes are not observed, the model based on this null hypothesis
will generate a number of testable predictions discussed below.
The ﬁrst prediction, which is from Auriol (2006), is that, independently of
the type of commodity, a corrupt procurement oﬃcial favors limited tendering
procedures, thereby maximizing the price of the purchase and his bribe. We
thus expect corrupt Paraguayan public institutions to rely on the
exceptional purchase mechanisms. A ﬁrm, which is invited to serve the
market in a monopoly position, asks for the highest possible price, c. In the
rent sector, denoted by the superscript r, a contract of size q hence costs
T r(q) = cq.19
The decision parameter of government oﬃcials is b ∈ [0,1], the share of
T r(q) they take in exchange for giving the market to a ﬁrm without compe-
tition. In doing so, government oﬃcials do not try to distinguish between
diﬀerent entrepreneurs: they simply split the total quantity in equal parts
among them, asking for a ﬁxed share of each of these contracts in bribes.
commodities such as medicine or cars, which require a warranty or a certiﬁcation, are
characterized by larger values of cI − cf∗, justifying that ﬁrms choose formality.
19For more details see Auriol (2006).
12Let cr(b) ∈ [0,c] denotes the ﬁrm that is just indiﬀerent between the rent
and the productive sector. We show in the appendix that
c









> 0 if and only if c < cr(b) < c.
Entrepreneurs who choose to do business with the government are
the most eﬃcient ones and they make rents. By contrast entrepreneurs
with costs higher than cr(b) would make a loss, and so prefer not to enter the
procurement sector. It is intuitive that the share of ﬁrms in the rent sector,
cr(b)
c = (1 − b)
cQ
cQ+F < 1, decreases with b and F and increases with cQ. The
more greedy government representatives are, the more proﬁtable ﬁrms need
to be to do business with them: they need to be able to cover the ﬁxed cost
of entry plus the bribes and still make non-negative proﬁt.
To compute the optimal bribe rate, public oﬃcials internalize the risk of
corruption being detected and punished.20 Consistently with empirical evi-
dences in Paraguay for the time of our study, we focus on weak punishment:
in case of detection the bribe is simply lost to the oﬃcials. We assume that




c is the fraction of ﬁrms excluded from the rent sector and G(x) is a
strictly increasing and convex function varying between 0 and 1 for x ∈ [0,1].






. We deduce the
next result.
Proposition 2 Let φ = F
Qc ∈ [0,1) by assumption A2. Let HG(x) =
g(x)
1−G(x)











20This is a common assumption in the corruption literature, going back to the Becker and
Stigler (1974) crime-deterrence model. See for example Besley and MacLaren (1993) and
Mookherjee and Png (1995). Di Tella and Schardgrosky (2004) is an empirical application.
13Under a technical assumption, one can check that
dbr(φ)
dφ < 0 for all
φ ∈ [0,1] (see proof in the Appendix). Proposition 2 hence implies that
the optimal bribe rate decreases with F. This is because corruption com-
petes with taxation: ﬁrms that have to pay bribes are less able to pay taxes.
More importantly for the empirical analysis, the optimal bribe rate also in-
creases with the amount spent in public procurement Qc. Institutions with
large budgets are able to distribute larger lots to more ﬁrms, hence they can
ask for a larger share of contracts in bribes without increasing the risk of
detection. We hence expect, at the purchasing institution level, a pos-
itive correlation between the volume of procurement activity and
the use of exceptional purchase.
In practice corruption detection varies from one institution to another.
These diﬀer in their level of exposure to public scrutiny, depending for ex-
ample on how many people are harmed by corruption or on how politically
sensitive their activities are. They also diﬀer in their capacity to realize
and hide corrupt acts. In the context of the model, this simply translates
into hazard rate dominance, which implies stochastic dominance.21 The next
result is derived in the Appendix.










Everything else equal, institutions characterized by a lower probability
of detection (i.e., lower hazard rate) will have a higher bribe rate and, by
virtue of equation (2), smaller number of ﬁrms, and thus larger lots size.
We deduce that, everything else equal, institutions characterized by a
lower probability of detection will rely more heavily on exceptional
purchase and will have larger lots size attributed to their providers.
We are now ready to derive the global market equilibrium.




1−K(x) ∀x ∈ [0,1],
then it implies that G(x) ≤ K(x) ∀x ∈ [0,1] (e.g., see Nanda and Shaked, 2001).
14Proposition 4 Let br(φ) be deﬁned by equation (3) and cr(φ) =
1−br(φ)
1+φ c.




In the productive sector, formality prevails if and only if






Proposition 4 (see derivation in Appendix) indicates that the most pro-
ductive entrepreneurs (i.e., those with c ≤ cr( F
Qc)) choose the rent sector
where there is no competition and commodities are overpriced, while the less
productive ﬁrms are left to serve private demand. Compared to a corruption-
free economy, prices are higher both in the public and private segments of
the economy so that the quantities consumed and produced in equilibrium
are everywhere smaller, leading to lower aggregate production. Comparing
condition (6) with condition (1), it is straightforward to check that the for-
mal productive sector shrinks. This eﬀect is stronger in sectors where public
purchases are large. Indeed, since
dbr(φ)
dφ < 0, proposition 4 implies that
dcr(φ)
dφ < 0 for all φ ∈ [0,1] so that
dcr( F
cQ)
dcQ > 0. Moreover we can show that
dqr
dQ > 0 (see Appendix). Everything else being equal, the percentage
of entrepreneurs who enter the rent sector and the size of their lots
both increase with cQ.
4.2 Implications of the Model
The model generates 2 main sets of testable predictions.
1. Corruption and the structure of purchases. In practice procurement ac-
tivities are decentralized at the institution level (ministries, state enterprises,
etc.), so the predictions of the model apply at the purchase center-level. The
theory predicts that corrupt institutions rely on the exceptional mechanism
15to circumvent competition and maximize bribes. We do not observe bribes,
but we do observe purchase mechanisms. Therefore, we use the occurrence
of exceptional purchases as dependent variable, to proxy for the fact that a
given contract involves corruption.
First, proposition 2 shows that corrupt demands increase in markets
where institutions are big buyers of the good. Therefore, controlling for all
other standard determinants of exceptions, the likelihood that an individual
contract is made by exceptional purchase should be higher when an institu-
tion’s budget, as a percentage of the total sector’s production, increases.
Second, controlling for institutions’ budget size (which will be taken care
of by institutions-year ﬁxed eﬀects), we can exploit the heterogeneity in the
probability of corruption detection at the institution level stressed in propo-
sition 3. For institutions that are more eﬃcient at hiding corruption, we
expect a stronger correlation between the frequency of exceptional purchases
and the market shares attributed to providers.
2. Proﬁtability of ﬁrms. Entrepreneurs in the rent sector make proﬁts
that exceed the levels observed in normal competitive sectors. These rents
are derived from sales at inﬂated prices, because competition for the market
is suppressed by corruption. However, only entrepreneurs that are eﬃcient
enough can aﬀord to cover the cost of the related bribes. A corollary is
therefore that these entrepreneurs are also the most able ones, those with
the highest intrinsic or acquired abilities (see (5) in proposition 4).
Finally, the model has noteworthy industrial organization implications.
Although we do not intend to test these directly in this paper, we brieﬂy
address them in the conclusion. In sectors producing goods procured in-
tensively, the formal productive sector shrinks (see (6) in proposition 4). In
addition, sectors in which a large fraction of output is sold to the government
are characterized by less competition. Where there is corruption, prices are




The main data set tracks all the procurement transactions made over the
period 2004 to 2007 between 73 public entities (representing over 90% of to-
tal Paraguayan public spending and employment) and 5,517 diﬀerent private
suppliers.22 These 47,615 public purchases include all types of goods and ser-
vices, from stationary to machinery, oil purchases, food, services, etc. There
are good reasons to believe that no public procurement operations escape
registration as, under the new system, contracts need to be registered and
executed before the corresponding funds are released. Total public spending
amounts to Gs. 12,400 bn. (approx. US$ 2,235m), which represents 5.5% of
Paraguay’s GDP in 2004, 5.6% in 2005, 6.3% in 2006 and 6.9% in 2007.
Each observation in the procurement data set contains the name and type
of the public entity, the name and legal registration number (RUC) of the
supplying ﬁrm and its owner, and information on the purchase including the
nature of the good or service categorized in 16 diﬀerent groups, the total cost
in local currency, and the purchase mechanism used.
Purchase mechanisms are a key provision of the 2003 public procurement
law, regulating the procedures to be followed in allocating contracts depend-
ing on their total value expressed in multiples of the current legal minimum
daily wage (mdw).23 There are ﬁve legal purchase mechanisms with gradu-
ally increasing constraints on the minimum number of oﬀers, the mode and
length of publication of the call for oﬀers, and the attribution procedure.
Below a value of 2,000 mdw, a direct purchase is allowed, with public in-
stitutions legally compelled to have oﬀers from at least three diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Between 2,000 mdw and 10,000 mdw, a so-called competitive bidding process
22The data we use was initially painstakingly compiled by Transparencia Paraguay (TP),
the national chapter of the international NGO Transparency International, using the in-
formation published on the DNCP web site.
23See the Appendix for more details.
17is required, the call for oﬀers must be published in advance and the minimum
number of suitable oﬀers is ﬁve. Finally, for contracts of a value above 10,000
mdw, a national or an international public tender must be organized, with
still more stringent rules.
Figure 1
Finally, these guidelines can be disregarded in cases of emergency, such
as natural disasters or health epidemics (for example the dengue fever out-
break of 2007), for the purchase of patented and copyrighted goods, or for
purchases requiring defense secrecy. In those extraordinary circumstances,
public oﬃcials can skip all formal purchase requirements through the so-
called exceptional purchase mechanism. Figure 1 shows that exceptional
purchases are quite common for certain categories of goods or services, such
as rentals, advertisement, consultancy and transport.
The distribution of contract values has a fat left-hand tail (84% of pur-
chases cost less than 2000 mdw.), while 5.5% of contracts costing over 10,000
mdw make up 86% of the total spending. The sample mean is approximately
18US$ 47,000, equivalent to 36 times the national per capita GDP at the time.24
Firms’ proﬁts
We use annual rankings of top taxpayers published on the Ministry of
Finance’s web site. Firms’ ranks are determined by their total payments on
all taxes.25 Once public ﬁrms are excluded, we have information for 748 ﬁrms
in 2004, 459 ﬁrms in 2005, 482 ﬁrms in 2006, and 478 ﬁrms in 2007.
We use the information on total tax disbursements to approximate ﬁrms’
proﬁts, exploiting the fact that the income gains tax had a ﬂat rate of 30%
in 2004, 20% in 2005 and 10% thereafter. Issues related to the inclusion of
other taxes and to evasion are discussed in the empirical section below.
Import-export data
We also include annual rankings from the Customs’ SOFIA oﬃcial data
base. These include the full universe of importers from 2004 to 2007, includ-
ing the total free on board (FOB) value imported, and of exporters for the
same period, including the cost, insurance, freight (CIF) value exported.
Production data
We are able to match the good categories from our procurement database
with National Account data for 6 categories of goods (food, rentals, fuel
products, construction, machinery and transport). This is sectoral gross
GDP data at the 2-digit ISIC level, as published by the Paraguayan Central
Bank’s Oﬃce of Economic Studies. Fuel is an outlier, as large amounts are
bought from foreign companies (total procurement represents up to 15 times
national production in some years). Once it is excluded, we match 17,438
observations, equivalent to 36.6% of the initial sample. We use this data
to create a variable measuring total national production of the respective
sectors year by year.
24There are a bit more than 200 contracts with a value superior to US$ 1 million and
the largest contract is worth US$ 184 million. The 10 largest procurement contracts are
oil purchase by the state monopoly Petropar.
25Systematic data on total sales, proﬁts, etc., for the whole universe of ﬁrms could not
be accessed due to conﬁdentiality restrictions.
19Institution-level corruption indices
We introduce institution-level corruption indices for a subset of 13 institu-
tions in our sample.26 In total, this covers 15,640 of our initial observations,
equivalent to 32.8% of the total. These indices were developed by the NGO
Transparencia Paraguay between 2004 and 2008 (see Appendix for details).
6 Corruption and the Structure of Purchases
6.1 Methodology
First, we want to test one of the model’s main predictions, namely the fact
that the use of exceptional purchases increases in the share of institutions’
purchases in national sectoral production.
Our unit of observation is the individual purchase. Each of the 47,615
purchases available corresponds to a pair composed of a ﬁrm i and an in-
stitution j. The data set includes 73 institutions and 5517 ﬁrms, and in
total there are 13,693 diﬀerent “active” pairs, with an average number of
contracts equal to 3.5 (std. dev. 10.5), a minimum of 1 (for 7,215 pairs) and
a maximum of 460.
We estimate the following model:
excijkt = 1[exc
∗ = θi +θj +θk +θt +θjt +β1Qjkt +Xijktβ2 +εijkt > 0], (7)
where 1[.] is an indicator function equal to 1 if the statement in brackets is
true, exc is a binary variable equal to 1 if the contract is made through the
exception, θ
′s are ﬁrm (i), institution (j), good (k), year (t), and institution-
year (jt) ﬁxed eﬀects, Xijkt is a vector of controls, and Qjkt is the share of
26The institutions are Customs, the Senate, the Ministry of Education, the Supreme
Court, the Social Prevision Institute, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Housing
Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, the Superior Tribunal for Electoral
Justice, the National Institute for Rural Land Development, the Public Ministry (Public
Prosecutors’ Oﬃce), and the Police (which belongs to the Ministry of Interior).
20the total national production of good k procured by institution j in year t.
We expect β1 to be positive.
The vector of controls includes ﬁrm-institution level variables: the to-
tal value of each pair’s transactions, and the proportion of an institution’s
transactions done with each particular provider. These variables are meant
to control for additional political or personal connections, and other eﬀects
such as reputation, which may inﬂuence contract allocation. We report these
results, as they turn out to be relevant when we later introduce institution-
level corruption. Other controls include the size of contracts, as we expect
larger contracts that carry the obligation of an open bidding procedure to
induce a diﬀerent behavior, and the yearly level of production of the sector,
to ensure that our results are not polluted by sector size eﬀects, for example
if smaller sectors are more dependent on public procurement and therefore
more subject to abuses. These results are omitted to save space.
The inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects allows us to capture any systematic deter-
minants of exceptional purchase that would correspond to characteristics of
the ﬁrms (competitive advantage, exclusive dealing on a speciﬁc good), the
goods (patented or monopolistic goods) and the institutions (speciﬁcally ded-
icated to attend emergencies, involved in defense deals, etc., possibly with
changes over time), as well as speciﬁc time ﬂuctuations or trend in the use of
exceptions. Once these ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced, we expect no additional
features to be signiﬁcant if procurement rules are applied correctly.
We use a linear probability model to estimate the model above. The
inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects prevents us from using a probit estimation, while
a conditional logit would imply eliminating any pair for which there is no
within variation, therefore reducing the ﬁnal sample by approximately half.
6.2 Results
Table 1 contains the ﬁrst set of results. It shows that more corruption (ex-
ceptional purchase) occurs when a public institution is a big buyer on the
21market, in the sense of purchasing a large share of a sector’s production. In
columns 1 to 4, the variable Qjkt (Procurement/Nat.Prodjkt) is systemati-
cally positive and signiﬁcant. One additional percentage point in the share
of the sector’s production implies a 0.2 to 0.3% increase in the probability
of using the exception. It is hard to think of an explanation other than
corruption to explain the positive sign of the variable Qjkt.
This result is key to understanding the distortions induced by corrupt
procurement. Indeed, it tells us that in each sector the prevalence of wron-
doings is positively related to the weight of the public sector as a client.
The economic eﬀect is far from trivial. Domestic producers in sectors in
which public purchases represent around 25% of total sales, such as drugs
or machinery, face a 5 to 8% additional probability of being favoured with
exceptional purchases compared with other sectors where public intervention
is marginal (around 1% for transport or food for example). Given the extra-
proﬁtability that we uncover in the next section, this clearly increases the
attractivity of these activities.
Moreover, this is reinforced by the nature of speciﬁc institution-ﬁrm in-
teractions. In columns 2 to 4, we also show that ﬁrm-institution pairs that do
more business together use the exceptional purchase mechanism more often.
The coeﬃcient for the total value of a pair’s transactions (firm_instit_val)
in column 2 implies that an additional US$ 200,000 translate in an in-
crease of 0.4% in the probability to use the exception. The coeﬃcient for
the share of institutions’ transactions done with each particular provider
(instit_firm_val_share) in column 3 implies that an institution that in-
creases the share of its total procurement volume allocated to a particular
ﬁrm by one standard deviation above the sample mean (that is 3.8% of its
portfolio rather than 0.9%), would increase the share of its contracts with
that particular ﬁrm made through the exception by more than 13%. A pair
with a volume of contracts two standard deviations above the sample mean
(that is 6.7% of the institution’s portfolio rather than 0.9%), would use the
22exception for 22% of its contracts.
[insert Table 1 here]
In columns 5 and 6, we run some robustness checks on the pair variables,
using alternative samples.27 First, we use the whole sample, and then restrict
ourselves to the period 2004-2005, in which the prevalence of exceptional
purchases was higher. In both cases, the signs are as expected and the
instit_firm_val_share variable is nearly signiﬁcant at the 10% level, while
firm_instit_val is strongly signiﬁcant in the 2004-2005 sample.
Alternative interpretations are possible for the results that frequent pair
interactions lead to more contracts through the exception. For example, one
could argue that a “reputation” eﬀect is at play. In circumstances where
public institutions need to use exceptional mechanisms, for example because
of some social emergency, they naturally turn to ﬁrms they have had frequent
interactions with, because they know these are more reliable. Yet another
explanation would involve simple ineﬃciency or passive waste, as Bandiera
et al. (2009) document in the case of public procurement in Italy. Here,
the argument would be that procurement oﬃcials simply award contracts to
ﬁrms they already know, because they do not internalize the new rules (they
may be badly informed about the regulations and fail to respect deadlines or
to advertise the calls for applications) or because they are lazy and it is the
solution that requires less eﬀort.
To evaluate both the “reputation” and the “eﬃciency” arguments and
compare them to the “corruption” story, we can use the result of proposition
4. It suggests that institutions more exposed to public scrutiny use less ex-
ceptional purchase. We use the institution-level corruption indices described
in the data section to proxy for this exposure. We measure corruption with
a synthetic index equal to the arithmetic mean of the three original indices,
27As we include all good categories, this forces us to exclude the production share
variable.
23namely the evaluations based on the Comptroller General’s report and on
the number of administrative indictments in any given institution, and the
number of newspaper articles mentioning corruption in the institution.28
We introduce the following speciﬁcation:
excijkt = 1[exc
∗ = θi + θj + θk + θt + β1Qjkt + β2InstCorrjt
+Xijβ3 + (Xij ∗ InstCorrjt)β4 + Xijktβ5 + εijk > 0]. (8)
If the corruption story is relevant, we expect β2, and especially β4 to be
positive.
The results in Table 2 support the corruption hypothesis. In columns 1
to 3, we restrict our sample to the observations matched to the National Ac-
counts. Note that the variable measuring the share of procurement demand
in national production is again positive and strongly signiﬁcant.
In column (1), corruption introduced alone is positive (more corruption
corresponds to a higher value of the index) and nearly signiﬁcant.29 In col-
umn 2, pairs’ contract value becomes negative, while its interaction with
corruption is positive and signiﬁcant. This conﬁrms that the link between
frequent interactions and exceptional purchases is mediated by corruption.
Compared with Table 2, the eﬀect is 4 times larger for an institution that
is at the top of the corrupt scale (an additional US$ 200,000 translate in
an increase of 1.6% in the probability of using the exception, i.e., such an
institution would use it for 20% of its contracts). In column 3, the share of
an institution’s transactions done with a particular provider is now negative,
28The news index might be subject to caution, as press coverage of speciﬁc institutions,
based for example on journalists inquiries or on denunciations, is likely to be inﬂuenced by
the nature of the institutions and their past behavior in procurement or other activities.
Using only the mean of the evaluations based on the Comptroller General’s report and on
the number of administrative indictments in any given institution yields similar results.
29Note that when corruption is introduced alone, it rules out the use of institution-year
ﬁxed eﬀects. When introducing interactions, we prefer to control for these ﬁxed eﬀects
rather than just for corruption, as they capture the whole set of institution-year unobserved
eﬀects.
24while its interaction with corruption is positive and nearly signiﬁcant at the
10% level. Again comparing with Table 2, the eﬀect is 9 times larger for an
institution at the top of the corrupt scale: for one additional standard devi-
ation above the sample mean, this institution now has 120% more contracts
by exception than the sample mean, i.e., it would use it for 38% of its total
purchases with that ﬁrm.
[insert Table 2 here]
In columns 4 to 6, we perform robustness checks on the whole sample, and
in columns 7 to 9 we use the 2004-2005 subsample. Corruption alone is now
strongly signiﬁcant. In the 2004-2005 subsample, a 1 point increase in the
10 points scale implies a 23% increase in the probability that the exception
is used. The interaction terms are again as expected. In column 6, the
instit_firm_val_shareijkt variable is negative, while its interaction with
corruption is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level, and it is also nearly
so in column 9. In column 8, the firm_instit_valijkt variable is negative,
while its interaction with corruption is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The marginal eﬀects are comparable to those described above.
In the next Section, we show how this higher prevalence of corruption in
sectors where public institutions are big clients, and with speciﬁc frequent
sellers, distorts the proﬁtability of ﬁrms.
7 The Proﬁtability of Firms
The model second prediction is that, as a result of the corrupt practices un-
veiled above, entrepreneurs doing business with public institutions are more
proﬁtable than their counterparts serving private consumers. As a result,
we expect the most able entrepreneurs to self-select into the more proﬁtable
procurement activities, as only they are eﬃcient enough to aﬀord both the
entry cost to formality and the bribes to public oﬃcials.
257.1 Methodology
To test these eﬀects, we ﬁrst perform a reduced form analysis of the eﬀect
on ﬁrms’ proﬁts of a number of variables, derived from the results in the
previous section. As a proxy for the share of “favoured” contracts in the
ﬁrm’s portfolio, we use the share of a ﬁrm’s contracts made through the
exception, and the weighted average level of corruption of the institutions it
deals with (where the weights are the share of the sales to these institutions
in the ﬁrm’s total sales). In addition, we also use ﬁrms’ amount and number
of contracts.
The amount of taxes paid provides a reasonable approximation for proﬁts
because the tax rate on gains is ﬂat and uniform in each period (30% in 2004,
20% in 2005, 10% in 2006 and 2007). While the inclusion of other taxes
(among which custom duties are by far the largest component) introduces
some noise in the mapping between proﬁts and taxes paid, we control for
total imports in all estimations to minimize this issue. The model we want
to estimate is:
Git = α + β1Zit + β2Mit + Xitβ3 + θt + εit, (9)
where Git denotes the net gains of ﬁrm i in year t, Zit is the variable of interest
(alternatively, the share of sales through the exception, average corruption of
buyers, total sales to the state, number of contracts), Mit is the total amount
imported, Xit is a vector of control variables, and θt are time ﬁxed eﬀects.
However, the income tax and other taxes are amalgamated in the tax
data, so we only observe:
Tit = xtGit + δiMit + νit, (10)
where xt = 0.3 for 2004, xt = 0.2 for 2005, and xt = 0.1 for 2006 and 2007.
In order to obtain the ﬁrms’ net gains we therefore divide the total amount
paid in taxes by the corresponding tax rates.
26The distribution of proﬁts resulting from the available data is truncated
at a strictly positive point. Moreover, the set of ﬁrms for which we have non-
zero tax data is not constant over time. This forces us to restrict the panel
to the subset of strictly positive tax observations.30 As a result, we obtain an
unbalanced panel of 2167 observations across 4 years for 1017 private ﬁrms.
Using this sample, we test the following speciﬁcation:




under the assumption that Zit is uncorrelated with νit.
One worry is that unobserved ﬁrm characteristics might be correlated
both with the amount of taxes paid and with some of the Zit variables on the
right hand side.31 For example, more eﬃcient entrepreneurs might be more
successful in general, hence pay more taxes, and also win more procurement
contracts or be more frequently favoured through exception because of their
good reputation. Another concern is related to ﬁrm size. Indeed, bigger
ﬁrms may have larger overall proﬁts and also be in a better position to
win procurement contracts or to respond to emergency calls from public
institutions. To address such issues, we add ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀects θi to (11),
exploiting the panel dimension of the data to wash out any time invariant
ﬁrm-level unobserved characteristics.32
30Using all the observations to measure the variations in net gains, we would have
some positive measurement errors (when a ﬁrm’s tax observation is out of the sample and
therefore set at zero for one year and is positive the following one), some negative ones (in
the reverse case), and more generally errors going either way for ﬁrms that do not make
it to the ranking of top taxpayers.
31Note however that such endogeneity concerns are much less obvious for variables such
as the average level of corruption.
32We do not have additional ﬁrm-level data to control for such general characteristics.
Fixed eﬀects will take care of the size issue as long as it is reasonably constant over the
period of study.
277.2 Results
The results in Table 3 support our hypotheses. Column 1 shows that ﬁrm’s
proﬁts are signiﬁcantly increasing in the share of its contracts made by ex-
ceptional purchase. The average marginal eﬀect implies that a 1 percent
increase in the share of contracts made by exception corresponds to Gs. 28
millions (US$ 5,600) additional proﬁts.
In column 2, the correlation between the average level of corruption of
public buyers and ﬁrms’ proﬁtability is positive but only nearly signiﬁcant
at conventional levels, which is not surprising given that the sample size is
reduced to 261 since corruption indices are not available for all institutions.
[insert Table 3 here]
Finally, in columns 3 and 4, we look directly at the correlation between
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and their procurement activity. The coeﬃcients of both the
amounts sold and the number of contracts are positive and signiﬁcant. In
terms of marginal eﬀects, every additional Gs. sold to the state translates into
a Gs. 0.29 increase in proﬁts, i.e., a rate of return on procurement operations
of nearly 29%, while a ﬁrm obtaining an additional contract increases its
proﬁts by Gs. 154 millions (approx. US$ 30,800).33
A technical concern has to do with tax evasion. Indeed, it is likely that
Paraguayan ﬁrms do not report all of their sales for tax purpose, possibly
biasing our estimations. One could think that sales to the State, because they
are publicly registered, imply lower rates of evasion than other sales, in which
case we may be facing an upward bias in our estimations. However, strong
anecdotal evidence does suggest that well-connected ﬁrms use their inﬂuence
to evade a bigger share of their tax obligations. Large state providers exploit
loopholes in the tax system, in particular the fact that in Paraguay there is
not tax on personal gains, to transfer ﬁrms’ beneﬁts to non-taxable kind of
33Results not shown here to save space indicate that the results in columns 1 and 2 are
robust to systematically controlling for the amounts of ﬁrms’ sales to the State.
28revenues. This leads us to think that our estimates should be considered as
a lower bound on the true returns of these ﬁrms.
These results, together with those of the previous Section showing that
corruption looms larger in sector with important public purchases, imply
that average proﬁtability should be higher in sectors with an important pro-
curement component. In turn, this is likely to distort ﬁrms’ incentives and
induce additional entry of potential entrepreneurs into these sectors. Next,
we provide evidence of this self-selection process.
7.3 Misallocation of Talents
An important point of the model is that ﬁrms’ unobserved attributes (entre-
preneurial or networking skills, eﬃciency, etc.) should explain part of their
increased proﬁtability due to a self-selection process. Some of the best en-
trepreneurs are attracted to sectors where they can beneﬁt from the corrupt
allocation of procurement contracts, resulting in a misallocation of talents in
the economy.
The following test explicitly addresses the process of self-selection into
the procurement sector, using a procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p
631) to correct for the failure of the ignorability-of-treatment assumption.34
This entails estimating ﬁrst a probit model to explain the fact that ﬁrms
intervene in the procurement sector or not:
Yi = 1[Y
∗
i = θ0 + Xiθ1 + Siθ2 + ei > 0], (12)
where Yi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm sells to public institutions
at any point during the sample period, Xi is a vector of ﬁrm-level observables,
and Si is a set of instruments. From (12), we derive ￿ φ, the predicted density
and ￿ Φ, the corresponding predicted cumulative density. We then estimate,
34Fafchamps and La Ferrara (2009) apply this technique to control for individuals’ self-
selection into self-help groups based on unobservable characteristics.
29for each year, the following tobit model:
Git = max
￿
0,α + β1Zit + Xitβ2 + β3Yi
￿ φ
￿ Φ
+ β4 (1 − Yi)
￿ φ




Remember that Git denotes the net gains of ﬁrm i in year t, Zit is either
total ﬁrm’s sales to the state or its total number of contracts, and Xit is a
vector of control variables. We are interested in the statistical signiﬁcance
of the two last regressors, as an indication of self-selection, as well as in how
their inclusion will aﬀect the coeﬃcient β1.
The crucial point is the availability of suitable instruments, that would
predict access to the procurement sector, while being excludable from the
second stage. To generate instruments, we exploit the fact that apart from
raising the cost of procurement and changing the identity of sellers, corrup-
tion also distorts the sectorial abundance of ﬁrms. We capture this bias
by exploiting ﬁrms’ names, which are speciﬁc to the procurement categories
where a large number of ﬁrms are active (see ranking in Figure A.1). First,
there is a large number of contracts in oﬃce and machinery categories sold
by commercial intermediaries; locally, these are often nicknamed “suitcase
ﬁrms”, because they specialize in importing and selling any item upon re-
quest.35 Next, many contracts are in the construction and maintenance cat-
egories. Finally, we also focus on services, which are generally provided by
consulting ﬁrms.
For each of these three groups, we deﬁne sets of related words and create
three dummy variables, equal to one if at least one of the speciﬁc words
appears in the ﬁrms’ oﬃcial denomination.36 The ﬁrst stage shows that our
35For example, one of the ﬁrm in our sample, run by a member of close circuit of the
former president (also member of the Masonic loge and honorary consul of an Eastern
European country), won 301 contracts between 2004 and 2007, for close to $1.45m worth
of oﬃce supplies, electric material, cooking utensils, textile, chemical products, cleaning
products, computing equipment, Paraguayan ﬂags, etc.
36See the Appendix for the speciﬁc list of words used and descriptive statistics on these
30instruments are very strong predictors of ﬁrms being active in procurement
(see Appendix). Note that there is no reason to think that names inﬂuence
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability directly, supporting the excludability requirements.
Table 4 shows the results from estimating (13) on a sample of 12,759 ﬁrms.
For each year, we ﬁrst display the results from a standard tobit estimation
and then provide the results including self-selection correction terms, with
bootstrapped standard errors. Panel 1 uses the total volume of procurement
contracts as our variable of interest Zit, while panel 2 uses the total number
of contracts.
[insert Table 4 here]
The correction terms are strongly signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) in all es-
timations. Moreover, their inclusion systematically induces a reduction in
the estimated coeﬃcients of the variables of interest. The marginal eﬀect
of ﬁrms’ contract volume on their proﬁtability is reduced by between 9 and
19% (except in 2005, when it remains constant), and loses signiﬁcance in the
last three years. Similarly, the marginal eﬀect of the number of contracts
is reduced by between 19 and 42%, and becomes insigniﬁcant in the 2005
sample.
We conclude that part of the link between procurement and ﬁrms’ prof-
itability relates to unobserved self-selection of entrepreneurs into activities
that oﬀer privileged access to the procurement sector. This provides the ﬁ-
nal element of our story, in which would-be entrepreneurs are likely to be
disproportionately attracted to sectors in which strong demand from corrupt
public buyers generate opportunities for rent-seeking.
dummy variables.
318 Conclusion
We have illustrated the fact that rent-seeking is costly to development, by
showing how entrepreneurs’ economic incentives are distorted toward un-
productive activities as the result of favoritism in the allocation of public
contracts in Paraguay. After building an industrial organization model, we
have used a large scale microeconomic database including all public procure-
ment operations over a 4 year period to test the predictions of the model.
In Paraguay, institutions with an important procurement activity are more
likely to engage in corrupt dealings. As for ﬁrms, they have a greater proba-
bility of obtaining a contract directly through an exceptional procedure from
an institution with which they have a strong contractual relation, both in
terms of the total value and frequency of transactions, particularly when
dealing with more corrupt State entities.
We have also shown that ﬁrms trading more with the public sector are
more proﬁtable, even when controlling for their unobserved characteristics.
This overall picture embodies the consequences of a systematic misalloca-
tion of talents à la Murphy et al. (1991). In that sense, rent-seeking is
particularly costly because it destroys the development potential of the best
entrepreneurs.
Indeed, the Paraguayan entrepreneurial class is in its overwhelming ma-
jority imports-oriented, with over 90% of the top 500 taxpayers being im-
porters. Over the decade 1996-2005, the commercial balance displayed an
average deﬁcit of 8.5% of GDP. Large rents linked to the resale of imported
goods to the State and the historical absence of an import-substitution strat-
egy have contributed to make Paraguay one of the least industrialized econ-
omy in South America as, apart from the soybean and meat sectors, its
entrepreneurs have systematically specialized in commercial intermediation,
often with the public sector as sole client, rather than in production.37
37This has also fueled a ﬂourishing and illegal reexportation business to the neighbors
Brazil and Argentina. See Masi (2007) and Straub (1998) for more details on this.
32The costs of this productive atrophy and biased specialization are re-
ﬂected in the poor record of economic growth. After a period of signiﬁcant
growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, linked in particular to the massive con-
struction projects including the hydroelectric dams, the rate of growth of per
capita income was only 0.8% in the 1980s and strictly negative after that
(-0.1% and -0.6% in the 1990s and 2000s). Over the last two decades, the
Paraguayan Central Bank indicates that 92% of growth ﬂuctuations were
due directly to ﬂuctuation in agricultural production and exports. As a re-
sult, per capita income was lower in real terms in 2005 than it was at the
beginning of the 1980s.
33Appendix 1: The Model
Proof of proposition 1
The traditional method of production is less eﬃcient than the modern
method, so in the absence of an entry fee the informal sector disappears.
Indeed, when F = 0, the best technology prevails so that in equilibrium
p∗ = c = 0. However this outcome is upset when F > 0, as ﬁrms need
a mark-up to cover F. More generally let c ∈ [c,c]. Under competitive
pressure the smallest possible price compatible with a ﬁrm breaking even is
so that (p − c)(D(p) +
Qc
p ) = F. Setting c = 0 and D(p) = A − p yield
p(A−p) +Qc = F. Solving this second order equation in p we obtain pf∗ =
A/2 −
￿
A2/4 + Qc − F. In equilibrium formality prevails if pf∗ ≤ pI = c.
Proposition 1 follows. QED











assumption that G(.) is convex, one can easily check that EB(b) is concave
in b ∈ [0,1]. The ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient, so that the optimal bribe
rate, denoted br, solves
dEB(b)
db = 0. Proposition 2 follows. QED
Let φ = F






. It is straightforward to check
that under the assumption that G(x) is increasing and convex,
∂V (φ,b)
∂b >
0. By virtue of Proposition 2, br
G(φ) is such that: V (φ,b) = 1
b. Since V
increases with b while 1
b decreases with b these functions cross only once.
A suﬃcient condition for
dbr
G(φ)
dφ ≤ 0 is that
∂V (φ,b)
∂φ > 0 ∀b ∈ [0,1], which












≥ 0 ∀b ∈ [0,1]. A suﬃcient








1+φ ∀b ∈ [0,1]. This
technical condition depends on the distribution function G(x). An example
of function that meets the paper conditions is G(x) = x2 ∀x ∈ [0,1]. One
can check that
∂V (φ,b)
∂φ ≥ 0 is then equivalent to 1−b
b+φ + 2
b+φ
1+2φ+b ≥ 1 ∀b ∈
[0,1]. Diﬀerentiating the left hand side of the inequality with respect to b













φ + 1)2 + 1 − 2
￿
. QED
Proof of proposition 3
Let κ = F
cQ+F ∈ [0,1). Let β(b) =
bcQ+F





1−F(x)) be the hazard rate function associated to the















F − κ. Under the assumption that the distribution functions are
convex the inverse of the hazard rate function, 1
HF(x) and 1
HG(x), are decreasing
in x. Moreover HG(β) ≤ HF(β) implies 1
HF(β) ≤ 1





F which implies br
G ≥ br
F. QED
Proof of proposition 4
Let φ = F
Qc. Substituting br
G(φ), implicitely deﬁned by equation (3), in
equation (2) yields cr(φ) as deﬁned in proposition 3. In the formal produc-
tive sector, under the pressure of competition the best available technology
prevails. The price in the formal economy is such that (p − cr(φ))D(p) = F




(A − p) = F. Substituting cr(φ) in this








= 0. Solving this second
degree equation in p yields the value of the price in the formal sector (i.e., the
lowest root): pf = 1
2
￿





. Finally the formal
productive sector prevails in equilibrium if and only if pf ≤ pI = c. One can
check after some computations that this is equivalent to equation (6). QED
Finally we check that
dqr
dQ > 0. Let qr =
cQ










cr(φ)2. Substituting the derivative of φ = F




























dφ (1 + φ) − (1 − br
G(φ))
￿
. We deduce that
dqr


















dφ (1 + φ)φ > −(1 − br





Appendix 2: Procurement Data
Figure A1 shows the distribution of total volume and total number of
contracts, as well as total number of ﬁrms active by categories of goods and
services.
Figure A1
Legal requirements for public procurement purchases
The 2.051/03 law of Public Procurement aims to promote competition
among state providers and transparency in the procurement process. To this
end, it regulates purchases diﬀerently according to their value.
36The largest contracts (above 10,000 mdw; see Table A1 below) are made
through a Public Tendering. Calls for oﬀers on such contracts must be pub-
lished in the national press for a minimum of three days on top of the usual
publication in the oﬃcial newsletter and web site. The requirements and
criteria for evaluation must be restricted to technically indispensable requi-
sites. Grounds for disqualiﬁcation must concern the failure to comply with
substantial requisites, such as threatening the legality or solvency of the pro-
posal. In this way calculus mistakes or mistakes in the layout of the oﬀer,
which were often used to justify dismissal of an oﬀer are no longer considered
valid grounds. If two or more oﬀers comply with the technical requirements,
the oﬀer with the lowest price wins. Bids and the winning oﬀer are published
on the web site.
The competitive bidding process (between 2,000 and 10,000 mdw) does
not require a call for oﬀers in the national press. However ﬁve diﬀerent ﬁrms
have to make oﬀers and the call must be published on the web for any ﬁrm
who might qualify to participate in the bidding.
When the value of the contract does not reach 2,000 mdw, the contract-
ing institution can allocate the contract directly to a ﬁrm without organizing
an auction. It must however have published the call on the oﬃcial web site
and have received at least three oﬃcial oﬀers from diﬀerent ﬁrms. contracts
worth less than 20 mdw a ‘ﬁxed funds’ mechanism was created to allow insti-
tutions to purchase directly from a single supplier without justiﬁcation. This
mechanism has no speciﬁc requirement on the number of oﬀers or publication
of the call for oﬀers. We include it as a direct purchase.
Finally, in order to bypass costly administrative procedures in cases of
“force majeure”, the exceptional purchase mechanism described in the text
was created. Under this regime, institutions can purchase as much as they
want from a ﬁrm of their choice. The law stipulates that a report explaining
the reasons of the purchase and justifying the choice of provider should be
supplied to the national watchdog within a month after the date of purchase.
37In practice, this is rarely done.
Table A1 summarizes the evolution of the Paraguayan minimum daily
wage, the Guarani/US$ exchange rate, and the value of the thresholds deﬁned
above in US$.
Table A1: Minimum daily wage, exchange rate and procurement thresholds 
  Until April 2004  April 2004 to March 
2006 




Mdw in Gs.  Gs. 37,401  Gs. 41,889  Gs. 46,915  Gs. 51,607 
Mdw in US$   6.28  6.78 - 7.47  8.37 - 9.34  10.28 
Exchange rate 
bounds  1$ = Gs. 5,955 
Gs. 5,608 < 1$ < Gs. 
6,178 
Gs. 5,021 < 1$ < Gs. 
5,608 
 
1$ = Gs. 5,021 
    Procurement thresholds (US$)   
20 mdw  125.6  135.6 – 149.4  167.4 – 186.8  205.6 
2,000 mdw  12,560  13,560 – 14,940  16,740 – 18,680  20,560 
10,000 mdw  62,800  67,800 – 74,700  83,700 – 93,400  100,280 
Note: Average exchange rate provided by BCP (Paraguay Central Bank), 1US$ = Gs. 5955 in 2004,  
1 US$ = Gs.6178 in 2005, 1US$ = Gs. 5608 in 2006, 1 US$ = Gs.5021 in 2007. 
Institution corruption data
There are three tentative measures of corruption: the news index, which
counts the number of newspaper articles referring to corruption cases involv-
ing each speciﬁc institution, published in the 3 main national newspapers
each year; the control index, based on the Comptroller General’s (the “con-
traloria”) evaluation of each institution; and the trial index, summarizing
the number of outstanding administrative corruption cases in any given ad-
ministration. We rescale all indices on a 0-10 scale, with 10 representing
more corruption. The appeal of these indices, contrary to those based on
perceptions of corruption, is the objectivity of the criteria used to construct
them. More importantly, our theory calls for a measure of the probability of
detection at the institution level, which is well captured by these indices as
they are widely advertised.
Appendix 3: Empirical Evidence. Comple-
ments
Descriptive statistics on the relationship between institution
budget size, corruption and contracts size.
38The model predicts that public institutions with larger procurement bud-
gets contract with more ﬁrms (
dc(br)




For the 230 institution-year data points available, Table A2 displays the
empirical correlations between institutions total budget and average contract
size, total number of contracts and of providers, as well as the level of cor-
ruption for the subset of 37 institution-year pairs available. The correlations
between total budget and the ﬁrst three variables are all positive and strongly
signiﬁcant, indicating that institutions with bigger procurement budgets do
indeed oﬀer more and larger lots to a larger pool of providers. Moreover,
the average index of corruption (computed as the arithmetic mean of the
indices deﬁned above) displays the expected positive correlation, supporting
the idea that large buyers are more corrupt (although the correlation is not
signiﬁcant due to the reduced sample size).
Table A2: Institution-level correlations 








Institution total budget  0.95
a  0.18
a  0.27
a  0.19 
N  230  230  230  37 
a Significant at the 1% level. 
Self-selection dummies (Section 7.3)
We construct three dummy variables, equal to one if at least one of the
speciﬁc keywords appears in the ﬁrms’ oﬃcial denomination and zero other-
wise. The keywords are chosen so as to match standard names used by ﬁrms
in the relevant sectors of activities (allowing for variations such as abbrevia-
tions):
• “Import-export” dummy: ferretería, comercial, distribuidora, casa, rep-
resentación, servicio, supply, venta, supermercado, material, pieza, trade,
import, export.
39• “Construction and maintenance” dummy: ingeniero, arquitecto, mecanico,
taller, repuesto.
• “Consulting” dummy: abogado, auditor, consultor, associados, asesor,
communicación.
Table A3 shows how these categories of ﬁrms are represented among state
providers and non state providers respectively. Concerning excludability, as
stated in the text, there is no reason why ﬁrms names would inﬂuence their
proﬁtability directly, other than through the nature of their branch of activity
(the “construction” and “consultancy” dummies are actually negatively cor-
related with ﬁrm-level gains). The “import-export” dummy can be discussed
on the ground that it may aﬀect proﬁtability through a distinct channel,
namely the fact that ﬁrms in these activities could also be beneﬁting from
the widespread smuggling rents available in the Paraguayan economy. To
address this concern, we rerun the estimations excluding this variable from
the set of instruments. Results, not shown here to save space, are identical
to those in Table 6. Table A4 presents the ﬁrst stage estimations, including
respectively the three instruments or only the last two.
40Table A3: Distribution of self-selection dummies  
State  providers  0  1  Total 
Impexp       
0  7,035 (97.1%)  4,170 (75.7%)  11,745 
1  213 (2.9%)  801 (24.3%)  1,014 
Construct       
0  7,224 (99.7%)  4,983 (90.4%)  12,207 
1  24 (0.3%)  528 (9.6%)  552 
Consult       
0  7,246 (99.97%)  5,277 (95.8%)  12,523 
1  2 (0.03%)  234 (4.2%)  236 
Total  7,248  5,511  12,759 
Note: In each cell, the number in parenthesis indicates the share of firms  with or without 
 the name attribute, as a percentage of the total of firms in the category (state provider or  
not). For example, firms in the “impexp” category represent 2.9% (213/7248) of non state 
 providers, and 24.3% (801/5511) of state providers. 
Table A4 : First stage estimations 
  (1)  (2) 
  State provider dummy  State provider dummy 
impexp  1.051   
  (0.080)***   
construct  1.540  1.781 
  (0.164)***  (0.163)*** 
consult  2.244  2.170 
  (0.547)***  (0.542)*** 
Importer  -2.414  -2.415 
  (0.036)***  (0.034)*** 
Exporter  -1.235  -1.241 
  (0.074)***  (0.076)*** 
Constant  1.303  1.379 
  (0.026)***  (0.025)*** 
Pseudo R2  0.53  0.51 
Observations  12759  12759 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%. 
41Table 1: Exceptional purchase determinants 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
    Matched sample goods only    Full sample  2004-2005 
only 












Procurement/Nat.Prodjkt  0.178**  0.167**  0.175**  0.0313***     
  (0.0834)  (0.0817)  (0.0819)  (0.0108)     
Firm_instit_val    0.0430***    0.0324**  0.000499  0.0296*** 
    (0.0139)    (0.0126)  (0.00160)  (0.00719) 
Instit_firm_val_share      0.135***  0.101**  0.0211  0.0112 
      (0.0508)  (0.0450)  (0.0136)  (0.00817) 
Firms F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Instit. F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Goods F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Instit*years F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  17438  17438  17438  17438  47615  22180 
R-squared  0.597  0.597  0.597  0.598  0.532  0.524 
Note: Procurement/Nat.Prodjkt = institution j’s purchase of good k as a fraction of sector k’s production;  
firm_instit_val = total value of pair ij contracts; firm_instit_num = total number of pair ij contracts; 
instit_firm_val_share = value of institution j contracts with firm i as a share of total value of institution j contracts. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the institution level. * significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 2: Exceptional purchase determinants and institution-level corruption  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Matched goods sample only    Full sample    2004-2005 only 


















Procurement/Nat.Prodjkt  1.026*  0.838*  0.813*             
  (0.472)  (0.398)  (0.405)             
Corruption  0.0212      0.0119*      0.234***     
  (0.0170)      (0.00617)      (0.0412)     
Firm_instit_val    -0.0381      0.0245      -0.0960   
    (0.0681)      (0.0209)      (0.0555)   
Valij_corrupt    0.0198**      0.00354      0.0270***   
    (0.00866)      (0.00429)      (0.00838)   
Instit_firm_val_share      -0.0385      -0.148      -0.151 
      (0.284)      (0.103)      (0.148) 
Sharej_valij_corrupt      0.124      0.0746*      0.0605 
      (0.0808)      (0.0411)      (0.0443) 
Firms F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Instit. F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Goods F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Instit*years F.E.    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Observations  5435  5435  5435  15640  15640  15640  3474  3474  3474 
R-squared  0.692  0.712  0.712  0.582  0.602  0.602  0.605  0.609  0.608 
Note: valij_corrupt = interaction (firm_instit_val*institution corruption index); sharej_numij_corrupt = interaction (instit_firm_num_share* 
institution corruption index); See Table 2 notes for other definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the institution level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
42Table 3: Procurement and profitability of firms 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Gain  Gain  Gain  Gain 
  Random effects  Fixed effects  Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
Imports  0.001  0.003  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Exports  -0.000  -0.024  0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)**  (0.021)  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Exceptional purchase  2.834       
  (1.412)**       
Corruption index    1.205     
    (0.814)     
Amount sold      0.293   
      (0.108)***   
Number of contracts        0.154 
        (0.062)** 
Time F.E.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firms F.E.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  476  261  2167  2167 
R-squared  0.46  0.66  0.25  0.25 
Hausman chi2  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Note: All data adjusted for yearly price variations. In each case, we test the appropriateness of the  
random versus the fixed effect model, using the standard Hausman test. We report only the  
specification supported by the test. 
Table 4: Self-selection into procurement and firms’ profitability 
Panel 1  (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)   (6)  (7)   (8) 
  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
  Gains 2004  Gains 2004  Gains 2005  Gains 2005  Gains 2006  Gains 2006  Gains 2007  Gains 2007 
Volume of contracts  0.009  0.008  0.041  0.041  0.129  0.105  0.075  0.068 
  (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.016)**  (0.034)  (0.035)***  (0.141)  (0.026)***  (0.159) 
Import dummy  3.701  4.101  10.653  11.527  27.689  29.632  30.800  33.454 
  (1.130)***  (1.315)***  (3.172)***  (3.855)***  (7.237)***  (8.087)***  (8.443)***  (9.323)*** 
Import volume  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Export dummy  1.387  1.440  4.173  4.658  25.662  29.741  17.759  17.168 
  (0.512)***  (0.553)***  (1.402)***  (1.690)***  (7.185)***  (8.254)***  (5.610)***  (5.732)*** 
Export volume  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)*  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)***  (0.001) 
mills1    1.035    1.552    10.834    10.103 
    (0.283)***    (0.470)***    (2.583)***    (2.465)*** 
mills2    3.816    6.741    24.041    25.150 
    (1.172)***    (2.201)***    (6.138)***    (6.823)*** 
Pseudo R2  0.185  0.232  0.275  0.289  0.133  0.162  0.156  0.178 
Observations  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759 
 
Panel 2  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
  Gains 2004  Gains 2004  Gains 2005  Gains 2005  Gains 2006  Gains 2006  Gains 2007  Gains 2007 
Number of contracts  0.010  0.007  0.032  0.026  0.270  0.187  0.256  0.150 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.016)**  (0.024)  (0.069)***  (0.061)***  (0.083)***  (0.072)** 
Import dummy  3.696  4.101  10.625  11.511  27.721  29.748  30.746  33.512 
  (1.133)***  (1.386)***  (3.179)***  (3.634)***  (7.255)***  (7.935)***  (8.429)***  (9.360)*** 
Import volume  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Export dummy  1.381  1.440  4.148  4.653  25.895  29.942  17.438  17.196 
  (0.514)***  (0.566)**  (1.412)***  (1.606)***  (7.235)***  (8.331)***  (5.541)***  (5.616)*** 
Export volume  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)*  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)***  (0.001) 
mills1    1.020    1.501    10.328    9.694 
    (0.289)***    (0.486)***    (2.446)***    (2.312)*** 
mills2    3.817    6.741    24.171    25.232 
    (1.229)***    (2.063)***    (6.130)***    (6.751)*** 
Pseudo R2  0.186  0.232  0.275  0.289  0.135  0.162  0.157  0.178 
Observations  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759  12759 
Note: Tobit specifications with left truncation at the lowest observed profit level in each year. For each specification, 
explanatory variables correspond to the relevant year. Robust standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped with 500 replications 
when mills ratios are included). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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